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Latin  America'sadjustmentproblemsin  thelate 1980scannotbe
attrbuted to failures  of G-3 (U.S.,  German,  and  Japanese)  fiscal
coordination  because  G-3 fiscal imbalances  imposed  little cost
on Latin America.  But concerted  G-3 monetary  contraction  in
response  to the second  oil shock  imposed  heavy  costs on Latin
America;  without  it, Latin American  GDP would  have been 5
percent higher in the 1980s.
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Allen,  Currie,  Srinivasan,  and Vines assess  the  stock by 5 percent  even after 10  years. The
effects  of OECD  monetary  and fiscal  policies  on  effects  of negative  income and interest  rates
Latin America  by means  of simulation  studies  emanating  from G-3 countries  are mutuaUy
using the LBS/NIESR  Global  Econometric  reinforcing.
Model  and a new empirical  model  of Latin  U.S. fiscal expansion  equal to 1 percent  of
America.  The Latin American  model  pays  baseline  GDP, sustained  over five years,  trans-
special attention  to the supply-side  detennination  mits negatively  to Latin America, where  GDP
of natural rate of output  and to the effects  of  falls 0.6 percent in the short run and remains
asset accumulation.  The Latin American  model  depressed  by 0.3 percent even after 10 years. The
and its properties  are presented  by both empirical  negative  effects  of higher  interest rates and
simulations  and by means  of a simple  analytical  diminished  competitiveness  dominate  the
representation.  This model of Latin America  is  positive  effects (which  are short-lived)  of
used in conjunction  with the Global  Econometric  expanded  U.S. demand  for Latin American
Model  to study  the macroeconomic  interactions  exports.
between  Latin America  and the rest of the world.  Similarly,  G-3 fiscal spending  shocks,  which
The assumption  in policy simulations  is that  are gradually  built up over five  years, then
G-3 exchange  rates arm  forward-looking  while  reversed  the next two years, have a mild negative
Latin America  pegs its currency  to the U.S.  effect on Latin American  GDP. The G-3 fiscal
dollar. It is postulated  that Latin American  fiscal  shocks  administered  were set to their actual
policy adjustments  target a baseline  current  magnitudes  relative  to baseline  GDP, as ob-
account  balance,  in the face of extemal  shocks.  served  in 1980-85  (U.S. expansion  of 3.5 percent
The simulation  results  reflect  a number  of  but contraction  in German  and Japanese  spend-
important  international  links, which  can be  ing of 4.4 percent  and 3.5 percent,  respectively).
quantified  as multiplier  properties  of the linked  Latin American  GDP is lower than baseline  GDP
system of models.  by 0.5 percent when  the shocks  peak at the end
A permanent  5 percent  cor traction  in the  of five years, but continues  to remain depressed
U.S. money  supply induces  a contraction  of  0.3 percent  by the end of 10 years.
about  the same  order in Latin American  GDP  The simulated  effects of G-3 monetary  and
and capital  stock. This is caused  by higher U.S.  fiscal  policies,  with the shocks  constructed  to
interest  rates and diminished  Latin American  reflect  their actual  sizes in the early 1980s,
competitiveness  in third markets,  reinforcing  the  suggest  that Latin America's adjustment  prob-
fall in U.S. demand.  lems in that period  cannot be attributed  to G-3
Similarly,  a combined  monetary  contractior.  fiscal imbalances  that arose because  of failures
in G-3 countries  on a permanent  footing  - a  of G-3 fiscal policy  coordination.  But concerted
contraction  like the one in 1978-80  (U.S., 5.2  G-3 monetary  contraction  in response  to the
percent,  German,  1  1.9  percent, and Japanese,  1.7  second  oil shock  imposed  heavy  costs on Latin
percent) hurts Latin America.  Latin American  America;  without  it, Latin American  GDP would
GDP remains  depressed  by 4 percent and capital  have been 5 percent  higher in the 1980s.
The  Policy  Research  Working  PaperSeries  dissemiinates  the  fmdings  of work  under  way  in theBank.  Anobjectiveof  the series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The fmdings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank policy.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterHow OECD Policies Affected Latin America in the 1980s
by
Chris  Allen, David  Currie,
T. G. Srinivasan, and  David Vines
Table of Contents
1.  Introduction  1
2.  The Latin American Model  1
2.1  Short Run  2
2.2  The Longer Run: Asset Accumulation Effects  4
2.3  Policy Framework  5
2.4  Stability,  Comparative  Statics, and  Simulation  Exercises  6
3.  Effects of Global Shocks on Latin America  10
3.1  A U.S.  Monetary Contraction  11
3.2  A US. Fiscal Expansion  12
4.  Re-Running the 1980s  13
4.1  Re-running G-3 Monetary Policy in the 1980s  13
4.2  Re-running G-3 Fiscal Policy in the 1980s  14
5.  Conclusions  16
References  17
Footnotes  19
Tables  211.  INTRODUCTION
In this paper we describe a new model of the Latin American region, built for the purpose of
studying  North-South  macroeconomic  interactions.  We then use it to discuss the macroeconomic
transmission  of global shocks to Latin America.
Section  2 of the paper presents the model and discusses its simulation  properties, both
empirically and by means of a simple analytical  representation.
In section 3 we examine the effects of stylized global shocks on Latin America, in
order to investigate  the nature of the process by which such shocks are transmitted  to the region
from the OECD. In each case, we first briefly discuss  the effects of these shocks  on the world
economy, as simulated  by the global econometric model (GEM) developed  at London Business
School and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. We then consider the
implications  suggested  for Latin America  when our regional  model  is connected  up to GEM. The
stylized shocks considered are a US monetary contraction  and a US fiscal expansion.
In section  4, we consider a historical  experiment.  We investigate  how the 1980s might
have differed for Latin America  if fiscal and monetary  policies  in the OECD had been different.
In particular we ask how out-turns might have changed if the global monetary  contraction  of the
early 1980s  had been  avoided, or if fiscal  policies  had been better coordinated  across the OECD.
The results shed light on the question of whether coordination failures amongst the OECD
countries exacerbated the adjustment  problems of Latin America in the 1980s.
The concluding  Section  5 draws attention  to limitations  of the study, in the context of
policy reactions in Latin America in the face of shocks emanating from OECD countries.
2.  THE LATIN AMERICAN  MODEL
This section describes  the properties of our macro-econometric  model of Latin America.  The
full specification  of  the model is given in  Srinivasan and Vines (1990).  The model is an
aggregate  one which covers aU  the principal Latin American  countries with the exception  of the
oil producer, Venezuela. The model has been econometrically  estimated using aggregate data
for the region constructed from individual  country data supplied by the World Bank. Its broad
theoretical structure is similar to the models of the Newly Industrializing  Economies, Other
Asian Economies, and African Economies  described in Srinivasan and Vines (1990, 1991a,b)
and Allen (1991).
The model consists of roughly forty equations. It includes a fully specified income-
expenditure  process, a supply side, and a foreign  trade sector, together with a full set of balanceof payments and government  accounts. Amongst the distinctive features of the model are the
determination  through capital accumulation  and the supply side of an endogenous  natural rate
of output, the presence  of real balance  effects  on consumption,  the integration  of the government
budget deficit and foreign exchange reserves with the money supply process, and a national
intertemporal  budget constraint satisfied by a government fiscal rule.
The absence of endogenous  interest rates and the importance  of asset accumulation  in
determining  equilibrium  make the behaviour  of the full model substantially  different from that
of  a conventional macro model of an industrialised  economy. We thus explain not only the
separate equations of the model but also its full simulation properties, developing a  simple
analytical  representation  to assist with this.
2.1  Short Run
Demand
There are separate  demand  equations for consumption,  investment, export and import volumes.
Real net exports add to domestic demand to determine  GDP.
The consumption  function  contains real income with an adjustment for changes in the
terms of trade and also financial wealth accumulation,  which is modelled  as the accumulation
of money (M2).
Investment expenditure is  determined by  a  stock adjustment process based on  a
neoclassical  demand for capital function. The desired capital stock is a function of output and
the cost of capital. Net investment  is a lagged adjustment  process to the desired capital stock.
Gross investment  includes an allowance for depreciation.  The capital stock feeds directly into
the supply side. The accumulation  of capital makes the trade-off between output and the real
exchange rate more favourable.
We have adopted a fairly conventional  model of international  trade. Export volumes
depend on export markets (with a long-run elasticity of unity) and on relative export prices 2
(with a quite high long-run elasticity  of nearly 2.5). Import volumes depend on both domestic
output (with a very high income elasticity3  of 2.57) and on the real exchange rate 4 (with a long-
run elasticity  of approximately  0.  1).  Overall the Marshall-Lerner  conditions  are found to hold
and the reduced-form  elasticity of the trade balance with respect to the real exchange rate is
around 2.5
We  have  explored empirically the  multiplier properties  of  aggregate  demand
determination  within the model  by means  of partial simulations  - with all prices held constant -
in  response to an increase in  government spending. There are  long cycles of  multiplier-
accelerator  interaction  with a periodicity  of 1  I years. The full multiplier  converges  to a long-run
value of about 1.6.
2We may represent the demand side of the model  analytically  by means of Equation 1
which shows the aggregate demand function, normalised  on output, y. Aggregate demand is
reduced by higher domestic prices relative to foreign prices measured in domestic currency.
(e + p  - p);  it is an increasing  function of world trade, z, of government  spending, g, and of
real  asset stocks, a  ;  and  it  also  depends on  investment which  (abstracting here  from
depreciation)  is equal to the rate of change of the capital stock, dk/dt.  K,  is the Keynesian
income-expenditure  multiplier.
y = xJsZ+0 1(e+P-P)+P3 2a+g.kJ  (1)
Supply
The supply side of the model consists of two equations:  one each for prices and real
wages.
Prices  are a mark-up  on marginal  costs, which are composed  of wage  and import costs,
and a term in the output-capital  ratio. 6 A rise in output, or a fall in capital, ceteris paribus leads
to an increase in the mark-up over costs. In the estimation which included the heavily import-
constrained 1980s, a term in the import-output  ratio was included in the equation to proxy
movements in  the shadow price of imports. This term has been fixed out in  the reported
simulations.
The wage equation  is for real wages, with a small term in productivity  growth. As a
result of the continent's wide experience  of hyper-inflationary  conditions,  real wages were fourd
to  be invariant to  the price  level, but are  in  the very  short term negatively affected by
inflationary  surprises.
We have explored the supply side of the model through  joint simulations  of the wage
and price equations. Consider a permanent increase in output supplied, with the capital stock
fixed. Marginal  costs rise and so prices increase. With real wage resistance,  nominal wages rise
along with prices. If the nominal exchange rate is fixed, domestic prices will rise relative to
import  prices, appreciating  the real exchange  rate. We find the size of this effect is large: a one
per cent increase  in output requires approximately  a 3 percent appreciation  of the real exchange
rate. This aspect of the model is extremely "un-Keynesian"  in that the short-run adjustment
dynamics  are extremely fast and are mainly  completed  within a year: higher output very quickly
requires  a higher exchange  rate and the reliance which can be placed on unanticipated  inflation
is both small and short-lived. 7
Taken together the wage and price equations can be solved to obtain an aggregate
supply  equation.  Aggregate  supply  becomes  a function  of the capital  stock and of price surprises,
and a decreasing function  of the real exchange  rate (defined  as the real domestic currency price
of imports). We represent this supply function in Equation 2, normalising  on domestic prices,
P.
3p  = e+p.aC 1(a2y-k)  *2>1  (2)
An increase  in the output/capital  ratio, y - k, raises the price level as producer mark-up over
short-run  costs increase, as does an increase  in import prices in domestic  currency, e + p'.  But
an equiproportionate  increase  in both output and capital will not leave the price level unchanged
- it will raise prices because  of the existence  of a labour constraint. 8 The formulation  here - even
though it is "short run" - abstracts  from the effects of surprise inflation, which, as noted above,
were found to be very short-lived  indeed.
Reduced  Form
Taking equations 1 and 2 together gives short-run solutions for output and prices,
conditional  on the values of the asset stocks, k and a.  These are
y = t1x2[Pack+z+A2a+g k]  (3)
and
p  = e+p* + yl[-k+p 2 aggk+zl  (4)
where K 2 =  1 / [1  +  KlaCa2fll  I is a kind of 'price multiplier"  and -y,  =  zK2CI2.
2.2  The Longer  Run: Asset Accumulation  Effects
Accumulation  of both real and financial  assets plays a key role in the full closure of
the model.
Investment  and Capital
Investment  generates  a gradual adjustment  of the capital stock to a level depending  on
the cost of capital 9. In the estimated model this cost of capital is taken to be the world rate of
interest, r',  although  in subsequent  simulation  work we are introducing  a risk premium related
to the overhang  of debt (see Allen et. al.,  1991),o. We represent the investment function as
k  = t(y-k-er*)  ()
Domestic Debt
The  model includes a  fully specified set of  government accounts.  Govemment
investment  follows  private investment  and tax revenues  are endogenous.  Thus we may represent
the change in nominal  domestic  debt asl I
4h  = -vy+g-r's  (6)
Reserves
The model also includes a fully specified model of the balance of payments accounts.
Interest and amortization payments on foreign debt are included, as well as service transactions.
Changes in reserves finance changes in the basic balance of payments. Capital flight is neglected
(but see the discussion of debt in Allen et al  1991). Thus,  abstracting  from  the effect of  the
exchange rate  on the valuation of  foreign exchange reserves,  the change  in  reserves  may be
written as
s  = z  +  P1(e+p-p)-1y+rs  (7)
MAoney
The term in the consumption function for the real stock of domestic assets is proxied
by the real  money  stock,  whose  evolution  we  now discuss.  The  nominal  money  supply  is
endogenous, and is dependent on the creation of base  money. Base money in turn depends on
domestic credit  and  foreign exchange  reserves.  Only a proportion  of the government  deficit
(dh/dt) and of changes in reserves  (ds/ct) are assumed to be monetized,  the proportions  being
based on historical experience. 12 We thus write
*  = n(q+A)-p'  (8)
where the final term shows the erosion  of real asset values due to inflation.13
2.3  Policy Framework
In simulations of  the model,  the nominal exchange  rate  is normally  assumed  to be
pegged at baseline values against the dollar. Interest rates are therefore  fixed at the US real rate
of interest (but see the work on debt in Allen et al 1991) and there are no effects from domestic
capital markets.
Latin America suffers from debt overhang problems and is severely constrained in its
ability to borrow abroad.  This  implies that current account deficits  lead to losses of  reserves,
and  eventually  to  a  curtailment  of domestic  spending.  To  simulate this  constraint,  we  have
implemented a feed-back rule for government consumption on changes in reserves.  Government
consumption is assumed to move so that deviations in both the change and level of reserves from
base  have an  impact on government  consumption.  The  feedback rule,  expressed  in terms  of
deviations from the base, is in the form:
Ag =  0.8*As  +0.4*s-1 (9)
5The coefficients  on the rule are imposed, not estimated. They give a relatively rapid response
in government  consumption  to changes in reserves.
Another  possible response to debt overhang, namely default, is discussed in detail in
Allen et al 1991.
2.4  Stability, Comparative Statics and Simulation Exercises
Stability
Consider our simple analytic representation  of the model. For ease of exposition,  we
set the exogenous  variables z. g, e, p,  and r' to zero. Using equations (6) and (7) we may then
write equation (8) as
(10)
a =  -2X+)-
After substitution  from equations (3) and (4) we may further reduce equations (5) and (10) to
the following  pair of differential  equations  in the state variables a and k.
a =  (l-K 1 1 K21,7)5 1 IK2 cX 1,, 1(lIL|+T)k  - (K,K2(flj  j  T)$2a11)
- tqKiK2(0joAi  +Jy-+T  a-  K2%k
k(l-O,tjAc)=O  -(l -Kj,2#jaj)k +  KIK202a]  (12)
Tedious manipulation  reveals the following three stability conditions on asset-accumulation
processes in the model.
(i)  Necessary:  n  >  0
This  makes sure  that changes in  reserves affect the  money supply,  so  that the
monetary-approach-to-the-balance-of-payments  (MAB)  stabilising  mechanism  is allowed
to operate.
(ii) Necessary:  (1-KI)C 2) >  0
This ensures that multiplier-accelerator  interaction  is not instantaneously  explosive.
6(iii) Sifflcient  (when  combined  with (i) and (ii)):  (I - KjK,j31 a  )>0
This ensures that the supply-side  effect of a  reduction in exports  - which lowers
output, leads to a reduction  in investment,  a lower capital stock, higher prices, and so
again lower exports - is not so great as to lead to a cumulative collapse.
This stability  analysis is important  for understanding  the simulation  properties of the empirical
model.  Without  the MAB mechanism  the full model  blows up. Multiplier  accelerator  interactions
initially  created such  large cycles in the full model' 4, as to bead  us to consider very carefully
the estimation  of the investment  function.  And the exploration  of supply-side  collapse  in the face
of lower exports is one of the main tasks which  we have set for the model: simulations  show  that
it is significant,but  not cumulatively  implosive.
Comparative  Statics
We consider the effects of changes in the exogenous variables g,  z, p*,  and r; on
output, prices and the trade balance. (The trade balance, j,  equals the first three terms of
equation (7).)
In the short-run,  we assume that both the stock of nominal financial assets and the
capital  stock are fixed. The short-run  comparative  statics  results can be therefore be determined
from equations (3) and (4). The results are reported in  Chart 1.  Two factors combine to
determine the results. The first is the orthodox multiplier-accelerator  mechanism,  which must
be positive for the model to fulfil the stabilitv  conditions.  The second is the wealth effect from
the erosion of the value of the financial asset stock resulting from a price  rise. This term
(denoted  by 0) reduces the impact  of the multiplier-accelerator  mechanism.
Increases in  government spending and  world trade both  increase output by  the
combination  of the two multipliers  and raise prices. The trade balance strictly worsens for an
increase in government  spending as a result of higher absorption  and poorer competitiveness.
In a world trade shock, these effects  are almost  certainly outweighed  by the direct improvement
in the volume of exports.
Increases in world prices have short-run effects purely through the erosion of asset
value by inflation. Output is reduced and prices rise by  less than the full amount of  the
international  price rise. The trade balance  improves  as a result of increased  competitiveness  and
reduced absorption.
An increase in world interest rates has a negative effect on output through lowering
investment  demand. Prices fall purely as a result of demand effects; the capital  stock is assumed
constant in the short-run. The trade balance improves.
Long-run  effects can be obtained from equations (11) and (12) by setting  daldt and
dk/dt equal to zero in (5) and (8) to solve for k and a  and then substituting for y and p  in
equations  (3) and (4).  The results are reported in Chart 2.  Increasesin government spending
7Chart  1: Short-Run Comparative Statics
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9and world trade both increase output, essentially  because they inject as.:ets  into the system (see
equations  (6) to (8)).  Prices may rise or fall, depending  on what is nece sary to preserve asset
equilibrium  (see equation  (4)). If a fall is required then this can be made c,  isistent  with supply-
side  equilibrium  even if output rises, provided the capital  stock  increases. II *reased  government
expenditure  clearly  worsens  the trade balance, but by less than  proportionates because  of higher
tax revenues; increased world trade improves the trade balance only to t. e  extent that tax
revenues rise.
In the longer-term, the model is neutral with respect to higher world orices.  Higher
world interest rates depress output and raise prices (a negative supply-side shock): the trade
balance deteriorates because the effects of woisened competitiveness  dominate t.iose of lower
income.
Simulation  Erercises
The four shocks  discussed in the context of our theoretical model were per,ormed on
our empirical model  of Latin America. We briefly  give details of these simulations  hei !15.  Each
of the simulations  reported in this section  are performed without  the use of the feedback  rule for
government  spending.
As expected  a fiscal expansion  raises output and prices in the short-term and w. rsens
the trade balance. There is a long cycle  of 15 years  even though  the model  is supply  constr uned
in  the long-run. The multiplier-accelerator  feedback interacts with a  lagged oscillatic i of
competitiveness,  the trade balance and asset creation. In the long-run, more than 25 yeirs,
output converges towards a positive value, prices return to base, and the trade balanct  is
negative  as expected.
A world trade boom has similar  initial effects  on output  and prices as a fiscal expansion
and the trade balance  improves.  The qualitative  signs  of these outcomes  remain in the long-tern,
although  of course capital accumulation  mitigates  the price increase.
A world price increase has the temporary effects on output, prices and the trad-
balance  expected from chart 1. Neutrality  is achieved after about ten years.
Finally a rise in world interest rates depresses both output and prices in the short-run
and improves  the trade balance.  The dominance  of the negative  supply-side  effects  on prices and
the trade balance is already observed within about four years.
3.  EFFECTS  OF GLOBAL SHOCKS ON LATIN AMERICA
The empirical model of Latin America has the features of the theoretical analysis above.  To
illustrate  its workings,  we examine  the effects of stylised  global shocks on Latin America.  This
also helps to investigate the nature of the process by which these shocks  are transmitted  io the
region.  16 The shocks and results under each simulation  excercise is performed with respect to
10a base scenario over 40 quarters from the first quarter of 1990 to the last quarter of 1999. In
each case, we first briefly discuss the effects on the world economy, as simulated in GEM,
before describing the implications  for Latin America.
3.1  A US Monetary Contraction
We consider a 5 percent reduction in the US money  stock. This was simulated  in GEM
with interest rates being given by inverting the money demand function, and with forward-
looking exchange  rates determined  by uncovered interest parity.
The global outcome  is one in which US real interest rates rise, by 8 percentage points
in the first quarter; falling back rapidly to within 2 percentage  points of base within one year.
The US real exchange  rate appreciates  by 10 percent, taking three years to be back within 2.5
percent of base. US output is 2 percent below base in the first year and 3 percent in the second
year, before gradually returning. US prices fall by 5 percent in the long run, achieving  half of
this within two years.
There is positive transmission  of the shock to German  and Japanese output, which  both
rise initially by one percent' 7, but this effect disappears within a year. German and Japanese
prices are initially  unaffected.  The commodity  terms of trade fall gradually,' 8 and are nearly 4
percent lower after 2 years, before recovering slowly. World trade falls significantly.
The outcome (reported  in Table 1) is that Latin America faces a combined squeeze on
all fronts.
(i)  The rise in the dollar relative to other world currencies results in a decline of
competitiveness  of Latin American goods relative to their competitors.' 9 The worsening in the
terms of trade between commodities  and manufactures  worsens the Latin American terms of
trade because  the continent  is a net exporter of commodities  and a net importer  of manufactures.
In addition export volumes are also reduced because of the reduction in world trade.
(ii)  The increase in US interest rates increases the required level of debt service
payments, leading to a worsening  of the current account.
(iii)  The increase in US interest rates also increases the cost of capital, lowering
investment  and leading to a fall in the capital stock.
The effects of the squeeze  work both through  demand and through supply.
On the demand side, exports fall because  of: the loss in competitiveness,  the worsenIng
of the terms of trade, and the fall in world trade. The fall in demand is reinforced by the
restraint brought about by the current account  deficit. The current account initially worsens hs.
$7 bn, but the overhang  of debt limits the ability of the region to sustain a balance of payments
deficit. Therefore the government  is forced to implement  a reduction  in government  expenditure
11(presumably in  the  form of  an adjustment package). Finally investment expenditure falls
significantly  because of higher interest rates. The joint impact of these three demand effects is
a substantial  and sustained  reduction in output, of more than 5 percent of GDP.
The fall in output causes a significant  drop in the price level and depresses real wages.
Domestic prices fall by 20 percent and real wages by 2.5 percent. Lower prices result in a
recovery of competitiveness  and a big depreciation in the real exchange rate. Exports slowly
recover to their base values in the course of the simulation.  The big fall in the price level also
temporarily  boosts  consumption  via real balance  effects. But this influence  is only temporary  and
consumption  eventually falls back in line with output.
On the supply  side, there is a reduction  in investment  coming both from higher interest
rates and from lower output. Although  all the global influences  are short-run, their combined
effects lead to a long-lasting  reduction in the Latin American capital stock and therefore in
continental  real output.
There are thus  lasting effects  in Latin America  of reduction in US monetary  stock. The
capital  stock  has fallen  by 5 percent and output by 3.6 percent. The real wage is 2 percent lower
than base and there has been a small depreciation  in the real exchange rate.20
3.2  A US Fliscal  Expansion
We consider  an increase  in US government  expenditure  equal to one per cent of GDP,
sustained for five years. This was simulated in GEM with global money stocks fixed, and
interest rates and exchange rates endogenous.
The outcome is that US output rises initially  but falls back: the multiplier in the first
year is unity but most of the increase  is gone within less than two years. US (short) real interest
rates initially rise by two percentage points, and then fall back quite rapidly within eighteen
months.  Nevertheless  rates need to remain higher by half a percentage point for the full five
years to  crowd out  the increase in government expenditure. The US  real exchange rate
appreciates  by three percent, falling steadily back to base within five years. US prices hardly
rise at all; at most over the period they are 0.1 percent above base.
There is some  positive transmission  of the shock abroad, both through demand effects
on world trade and because  of the dollar appreciation. 21 The commodity  ierms of trade improve
initially by nearly one per cent, but fall back within two years.
The result of the US fiscal expansion is reported in Table 2.  Latin America faces a
mixture of expansionary  and contractionary  pressures, in which the latter dominate.
(i)  The increase in world trade and the improvement in the commodity terms of
trade lead to higher exports, but only in the first year. Subsequently  the depressing effects of
dollar appreciation  are dominant.
12(ii)  The increase in  US interest rates leads to a worsening of the current account
and a reduction  of the capital stock, in exactly the same way as with a US monetary  contraction.
The implications  of these effects are felt on both the demand and the supply sides.
On the demand side exports fall for reasons discussed above, but not to a very great
extent. The fall in demand is reinforced by the fiscal restraint brought about by the current
account  deficit.  Finally  investment  expenditure  falls  significantly  because  of higher interest rates.
The joint effect of these three demand effects is a sustained  reduction in output.
The fall in demand is bigger than the fall in supply and so there is a significant  drop
in the price level. The fall in the price level temporarily  boosts consumption via real balance
effects. But this influence  is small. The main demand effects are those listed above.
On the supply  side, there is a reduction  in investment  coming both from higher interest
rates and from lower output. This leads to a long-lasting  (if not very large) reduction in the
capital stock and therefore in continental  real output.
4.  RE-RUNNING  THE 1980s
4.1  Re-running  G3 Monetary PoHlcy  in the 1980s
An important  feature of the early 1980s was a marked tightening of monetary policy
in ail of the principal industrialized  countries in the wake of the second oil shock.  In contrast
to  the negative real  interest rates in  the  late  1970s, real interest rates  were persistently
considerably  higher in the  1980s compared with historical experience.  In this section, we
consider the effects of unwinding  the 1980s  tightening  of monetary policy.  This is an exercise
that has been carried out by Masson  and Helliwell  (1990). Masson  and Helliwell  use Multimod
for this exercise, and Multimod does not identify the Latin American region explicitly: rather
it disaggregates  only between high and low indebted  countries.  Our exercise has the advantage
of explicitly  identifying the impact  on Latin America.
For comparison with the work of Masson and Helliwell, we have simulated this
tightening  of policy by reducing  the money supply  in the principal countries  by the extent of the
deceleration  of monetary  base growth between 1978-79  and 1980-81. The US money  stock falls
by 5.2 percent, the Japanese  by 1.7 percent, and the German  by 11.9 percent. These reductions
are permanent and are implemented  from the first simulation  period.
The initial result is a significant  increase in world-wide interest rates.  As expected
from the relative size of the tightening, German  rates rise by more than US rates, which in turn
rise further than Japanese rates.  Hence the DM initially  appreciates  against the dollar, whilst
the yen depreciates. Overall, the US effective  exchange  rate depreciates  initially  by 6.5 percent.
13Domestic demand in all three of the principal economies  contracts sharply, led by
falling investment. Output also falls significantly  in the US and Germany, although there are
modest gains in  Japan from improved competitiveness.  The size of  output contraction is
moderated  in the longer term as lower prices begin to stimulate  consumption. The output  effects
are long-lasting,  however, with growth being redistributed  from the US, and especially Europe,
towards Japan.
The rmionetary  contraction  also has the effect of reducing prices.  Prices are forced
down by approximately  the size of the monetary contraction  in the US and Germany.  There is
a modest  increase in the price level in Japan.
The net effect of the monetary tightening  on world trade is a substantial  contraction.
Commodity  terms of trade worsen as a result of output contraction and the increased cost of
holding stocks.  Imports in all groups of developing  countries contract substantially.
In Latin America, the monetary tightening  has a major impact of 5-5½/2  percent on
output in the first two years (see Table 3).  Worsening  terms of trade push up domestic prices,
and higher interest rates impact directly on domestic investment. Investment initially falls by
some 10-14  percent and consumption  by 5 percent whilst net exports improve slightly. Output
remains depressed throughout the decade.  These results suggest that tight monetary policy
among the G3 countries imposed a high output cost on Latin America in the 1980s. The scale
of these effects is appreciably bigger than that reported for the highly indebted countries by
Masson and Helliwell (1990)  using Multimod.
4.2  Re-running  G3 FLscal  Policy in the 1980s
The divergence of fiscal policies  between the principal industrialized  countries in the
early 1980s  has dominated  much  of the subsequent  debate  on international  economic  policy. The
emergence of the large US budget deficit and the fiscal contractions in Japan and especially
Germany  have been blamed variously  for the emergence  of current account  imbalances, the rise
and fall of the dollar and slow growth in Europe.  They have also been blamed for the rise in
US interest rates and the onset of the Latin American  debt crisis.
To investigate  these issues, we have simulated  the effects of the cumulative  exogenous
changes in budget balances between 1980 and 1985 of the principal industrialized  economies,
as reported in HelJde  and Hooper (1988). The US fiscal expansion  is assumed to be worth 3.5
percent of GNP, whilst the German and Japanese contractions are put at 4.4 percent and 3.5
percent of their respective  GNPs.  For comparison  with Masson and Helliwell (1990), we have
implemented  these by means of changes in government expenditure.  The increase is spread
equally over the first five years of the simulation  and reversed in the two subsequent years.
Monetary  policy is not assumed  to accommodate  the fiscal changes  and the money  supply is kept
at base forecast values.
The  impact of  the  fiscal expansion on  interest rates  is  a  modest but  sustained
divergence of interest rates beween the three principal countries.  Because  of the sustained
14nature of the interest differential, the dollar initially appreciates  substantially  against both yen
and DM.  The effective dollar exchange rate initially appreciates by 9 percent.  The DM
depreciates  by 7 percent against the yen.
US domestic demand increases slowly  along with the government  expansion; roughly
half of the expansion is lost through crowded out private sector consumption  and investment.
Likewise, German and Japanese domestic demand contracts, but by less than the extent of the
fiscal contraction  as private sector expenditure  is crowded in.  The most interesting  effects are
on output: US GNP has expanded  by about 0.9 percent by the fifth year of the simulation,  giving
an implicit multiplier of  about 0.25 percent.  German and Japanese  output actually increase in
the short term as world trade expands and their competitiveness  against the US improves.
Subsequently  their output contracts as their domestic demand declines.  The US and Japanese
price levels fall, whilst Germa..y experiences  some modest import price inflation in the short
run.  The US current account balance worsens by some $60 billion, about half of which is
directly distributed  between Germany  and Japan.
Overall world trade and output expand  in the short run.  Movements  in the commodity
terms of trade are modest  as the impact  of the expansion  is outweighed  by the impact of higher
US interest rates.  The OPEC, Asian and African groups of developing  countries gain in the
short run as a result of the expansion  in world trade.
The impact on  Latin America is initially quite small, though negative (Table 4).
Higher interest rates depress investment, and exports decline, since Latin America experiences
an  exchange rate appreciation along with  the dollar and  so loses competitiveness.  The
deterioration  in the current balance resulting  from high interest rates forces a cut in government
spending, and output falls further falling by 1/2 percent after five years.
The simulation suggests that OECD fiscal policy was mildly harmful for  Latin
America, and differs from that of Masson  and Helliwell  (1990) who found a mildly beneficial
effect on their group of highly indebted  countries.  However, in neither case were the effects
of fiscal policy found to be large: our findings agree with those of Masson and Helliwell in
suggesting  that tight monetary  policy exerted the major negative  impact  on Latin America in the
late 1980s.
The re-run of history that we have  just described undoes both US and non-US fiscal
policy, and these moved in opposite  directions in the early 1980s. An alternative  re-run would
be to  undo the US fiscal policy but leave non-US policy unchanged, on  the grounds that
Reaganomics  represented the policy surprise and that fiscal consolidation  outside the US was
necessary  in any event.  The merits of this argument  can be disputed, but we report in table 5
the consequences  of undoing  only US fiscal policy. The impact is somewhat  more favorable 22,
but the long-run effects are little different.  These simulations  do not overturn the view that
failures of OECD monetary policy exerted the biggest influence.
15This result is of significance  for the debate concerning the impact of failures of G7
macroeconomic  policy coordination  in the 1980s  on LDCs.  Whereas the imbalances  of fiscal
policy across the G3 countries could have been avoided by alternative policies, the contraction
of monetary policy could not, if G3 inflation was to be kept down.  The finding that the G3
fiscal imbalances  imposed little or no cost on Latin America, in contrast to tighter monetary
policy, suggests  that the adjustment  problems  of Latin America  in the 1980s  cannot be attributed
to failures of G3 fiscal policy coordination.
5.  Conclusions
The aims of the paper were set out in the Introduction  and our findings have been summarized
in the relevant sections. Here we note  key limitations  of the task.
Models such as the one discussed here need to be used as tools to research policy
issues. Although  the present paper usefully  quantifies some  channels  of influence  linking OECD
macro policies and Latin American economic performance, it does not use this information  to
derive policy prescriptions. One question is  whether the  knowledge of  the transmissions
discussed  in this paper should  lead policy makers to respond differently  depending  on the source
of the shock, for example, on whether they observe a contractionary shock emanating from
contractionary  fiscal policy or monetary policy in the OECD. A second topic which we have
looked  at in some  detail but not touched on here, concerns the appropriate strength  and structure
of the feedback from external shock to fiscal adjustment which is explored in this paper. A
further question that might well change the outcomes, particularly in the case of US monetary
contraction  where the US dollar appreciates  so much, is  to what extent exchange  rate change
has a role to play in external adjustment13  . Related to this is the point concerning  whether any
nominal  exchange rate peg should, even if fixed, be expressed as fixed against a trade weighted
- .age of currencies  and not, as here, fixed against  the dollar. Finally, there is the issue of the
cxtent  to which the design  of macroeconomic  adjustment  should  be interconnected  with decisions
concerning  debt rescheduling  in the context of adverse external shocks.
However, there is another major concern as to how many of the issues raised above
can be answered, or even really make sense, at a regional  level ? It may be that such problems
need national solutions, and that a  broad picture of the kind painted in this paper, though
unspecific  about policy, is the best that one can hope for in analyzing  the experience  of a whole
continent.
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18FOOTNOTES.
1. This paper will appear in due course in the Manchester  School. We are grateful for comments
on earlier versions from Michael  Artis, Vikram  Nehru, Martin Weale, Steven Wright and from
participants  in seminars at the London Business  School and Cambridge  and Essex Universities.
The financial  support of the ESRC and the World Bank  is gratefully acknowledged.
2. Export prices depend on competitors' export prices and on domestic absorption  prices.
3. For a discussion of this issue see Muscatelli, Srinivasan and Vines (1990) and Krugman
(1989).
4.  We use a  small country assumption for import prices, which we assume are  fixed on
international  markets and not influenced  by domestic  developments.
5. But owing to the fast wage and price adjustment,  prices move rapidly to neutralise  the effects
of a nominal  exchange rate devaluation. (See below)
6. For reasons  of data availability  the equation  estimated  is for the consumer  expenditure  deflator
(ced). This can be thought  of as subsuming  an equation  for domestic  output prices - marked up
on wage and import costs - into an equation  for ced - by taking a weighted  average of domestic
output prices and import prices.
7. Were the government  to attempt to keep the real exchange rate fixed, this would require a
continuing acceleration in  inflation of  around 55 percent per  annum in  order  to  force  a
permanent  reduction in real wages.
8. Such a formulation,  with a unit coefficient  on import  prices and a larger coefficient  on output
than on capital, can be derived from the two equations  for wages and prices described above.
9. Equations 2 and 5 imply that, in the long run when capital has fully adjusted, prices are
determined  by foreign prices, the world interest rate and the level of output. Output matters
because of the labour constraint.
10. It is assumed here  that in  the context of hyper-inflation economies in  Latin America
investors  predict domestic real interest rates form foreign real interest rates.
11. Strictly, this equation should contain a term showing  interest payments on domestic debt,
h, and the simulalion model does this.  But that would introduce a term in h in equation 11,
which  we are keen to avoid for reasons  of analytical  tractability. Our implicit  assumption  is that
tax rates are adjusted to keep constant the overall net tax/transfer rate.
12. These proportions are for simplicity taken to be the same in the analytical sketch of the
model, but not in the actual model.
1913. This ignores as a second-order  effect the influence  of higher prices on the rate of (nominal)
asset creation.
14. Even though  it is a supply-constrained  model, and not a Keynesian  demand-determined  one
in all but the "very-very" short run.
15. Fuller discussion and output tables from the simulations  are contained in Srinivasan  and
Vines (1990).
16. For theoretical  discussion  of such transmission,  see Kanbur and Vines (1987), Currie et. al.
(1988), Moutos and Vines (1989), and Muscatelli  and Vines (1989).
17. A standard result in a Mundell-Fleming  model.
18. GEM does not contain a forward-looking  model of commodity  prices.
19. Latin America maintains  a fixed exchange  rate relative to the dollar in simulations.  When
US dollar appreciates,  the export prices of competitors  to Latin America  decline in terms of US
dollars and hence the loss of competitiveness  for Latin American Exporters.
20. Recall that the stability analysis performed earlier showed, inter aBla,  that the interaction
of demand and supply  is unlikely  to produce an unstable  spiral of the kind where lower demand
coming from the global shock leads to lower investment, lower supply, lower output and thus
to yet lower demand. But why then should a nominal global shock - which does not have
permanent  real effects in the OECD - cause lasting real effects in Latin America?  We have not
identified  a cause of hysteresis in the continent which would make these long-lasting effects
permanent.  Rather the lags in system response  seem to be very long, and real effects might well
die out eventually.
21. Again, positive transmission  in this way is a standard Mundell-Fleming  result.
22. Note that the timing of the fiscal shock in this simulation  differs considerably from that
reported in section 3.2. The simulation  there was for a one percentage point of GNP increase
in government spending sustained  for five years and then reversed. The current simulation  in
contrast  incrementally  increases  government  spending  up to a peak of 3.5 percent of GNP in the
fifth year, which is then reversed over two years. The effects of the timing of the two shocks
can be seen most clearly in the very different interest rate profiles in the two simulations  and
is also reflected  in the initial jump in the dollar exchange rate.
23. Experiments with exchange rate  depreciation in  response to  negative external shocks
deprived  the regional economy  of a nominal anchor and produced spiralling inflation.




Consumption  Investment  Consumption  Exports  Imports  GDP  Prices  Wages
1991  -5.79  -8.56  -6.54  -3.67  -6.77  -5.86  -13.21  -12.65
1992  -4.72  -17.57  -2.02  -7.78  -17.06  -5.78  -23.09  -25.20
1993  -2.14  -13.83  -9.37  -7.47  -13.55  -4.52  -20.25  -22.89
1994  .23  -8.67  -13.47  -6.81  -9.58  -2.83  -11.86  -13.90
1995  -.19  -3.23  -15.94  -6.78  -5.68  -2.90  -6.16  -7.19
1996  -1.77  -3.49  -13.35  -6.64  -6.55  -3.61  -7.03  -7.93
1997  -3.24  -5.57  -10.46  -5.68  -8.28  -4.27  -10.18  -11.53
1998  -3.63  -7.23  -7.23  -4.08  -9.15  -4.07  -11.27  -13.06
1999  -3.64  -6.30  -5.21  -2.55  -8.10  -3.55  -9.52  -11.30
Competi-  Capital  Budget  Current  Base
tiveness  LIBOR  Stock  Deficit  Balance  Reserves  Money  M2
%  % pts  %  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn
1991  5.16  5.41  -1.21  19484  -7087  -7087  -1891  -2459
1992  18.99  -.02  -3.55  11127  -2086  -9174  -1011  -3108
1993  13.80  -.33  -4.99  3184  -10916  -20091  -11078  -16669
1994  2.43  .16  -5.46  -4146  -18794  -38886  -30980  -52426
1995  -3.79  .43  -5.05  -6918  -25694  -64581  -58520  -114295
1996  -2.66  .34  -4.74  -3171  -23124  -87706  -82491  -190560
1997  1.06  .23  -4.79  3343  -18974  -106682  -100575  -269667
1998  2.58  .17  -5.09  7730  -14054  -120736  -112569  -342927
1999  .82  .16  -5.20  9342  -11165  -131903  -121244  -407612




Consumption  Investment  Consumption  Exports  Imports  GDP  Prices  Wages
1991  - 63  -2.34  -.14  .58  -.74  -.63  -2.53  -2.41
1992  -.15  -2.00  -.35  -.45  -1.59  -.37  -3.41  -3.77
1993  .07  -.86  -1.90  -.66  -.73  -.33  -2.31  -2.57
1994  .15  -.78  -2.17  -.63  -.69  -.29  -1.46  -1.60
1995  .06  -.64  -2.20  -.50  -.52  -.32  -1.18  -1.28
1996  .05  -.69  -1.61  -.33  -.53  -.25  -1.05  -1.18
1997  -.04  -.42  -1.36  -.17  -.35  -.23  -.79  -.91
1998  -.19  -.35  -.96  -.05  -.37  -.26  -.71  -.81
1999  -.37  -.43  -.53  .04  -.47  -.31  -.89  -.99
Competi-  Capital  Budget  Current  Base
tiveness  LIBOR  Stock  Deficit  Balance  Reserves  Money  M2
%  %  pts  %  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn
1991  .00  1.66  -.33  5374  -180  -180  1252  1628
1992  1.22  .36  -.57  2206  -509  -689  1332  2919
1993  .22  .25  -.60  455  -2905  -3594  -1451  242
1994  -.53  .27  -.62  17  -3566  -7161  -5022  -6351
1995  -.69  .31  -.61  133  -3903  -11064  -8889  -16185
1996  -.68  .30  -.62  250  -3076  -14139  -11897  -27266
1997  -.82  .27  -.58  543  -2779  -16919  -14532  -38768
1998  -.80  .24  -.53  1212  -2117  -19035  -16325  -49484
1999  -.58  .21  -.51  2123  -1305  -20340  -17063  -58256




Consumption  Investment  Consumption  Exports  Imports  GDP  Prices  Wages
1991  -5.43  -9.74  -7.85  -1.58  -6.36  -5.50  3.05  2.91
1992  -5.11  -14.09  -1.24  -5.06  -16.04  -4.95  -5.77  -7.60
1993  -3.88  -9.88  -2.65  -5.45  -12.23  -4.09  -5.96  -8.42
1994  -2.82  -7.14  -4.35  -5.43  -10.14  -3.33  -1.19  -3.23
1995  -3.19  -5.04  -6.00  -5.28  -8.19  -3.61  1.68  .26
1996  -3.71  -5.53  -5.47  -5.52  -8.87  -3.89  .92  -.55
1997  -3.99  -5.90  -5.05  -5.78  -9.32  -4.02  -.23  -1.95
1998  -3.86  -5.96  -4.52  -5.81  -9.37  -3.85  -.11  -1.97
1999  -3.71  -5.42  -4.22  -5.62  -8.74  -3.65  .94  -.84
Competi-  Capital  Budget  Current  Base
tiveness  LIBOR  Stock  Deficit  Balance  Reserves  Money  M2
%  % pts  %  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn
1991  7.08  6.36  -1.35  13487  -13159  -13159  -9563  -12432
1992  12.67  1.73  -3.65  12083  5558  -7601  -782  -10081
1993  9.64  1.01  -4.79  7291  -1058  -8660  102  -7217
1994  2.49  1.00  -5.16  1292  -6127  -14788  -5681  -12647
1995  -1.24  1.11  -5.07  531  -9899  -24688  -15439  -29292
1996  -.75  1.05  -5.09  363  -5172  -29861  -20515  -48024
1997  .39  0.94  -5.17  975  -2193  -32055  -22449  -64195
1998  .35  0.87  -5.26  951  57  -31999  -22139  -75580
1999  -.61  0.86  -5.23  720  389  -31610  -21559  -83125




Consumption  Investment  Consumption  Exports  Imports  GDP  Prices  Wages
1991  -.06  -1.04  1.72  -.40  -.06  -.06  -7.12  -6.80
1992  .31  -1.43  -.79  -.86  -.17  -.26  -8.79  -9.04
1993  .87  -2.02  -3.51  -.12  -.34  -.18  -6.08  -6.39
1994  .94  -1.97  -5.34  1.21  .01  -.18  -1.64  -1.79
1995  .22  -2.22  -6.06  2.26  -.38  -.54  2.82  2.75
1996  -.23  .65  -5.72  1.16  -1.00  -.40  4.68  4.55
1997  -.78  1.43  -3.20  .88  -.79  -.36  2.92  2.90
1998  -1.16  -.47  .29  1.13  -1.06  -.45  .50  .37
1999  -1.04  -.68  1.75  .65  -1.08  -.32  -.11  -.39
Competi-  Capital  Budget  Current  Base
tiveness  LIBOR  Stock  Deficit  Balance  Reserves  Money  M2
%  % pts  %  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn
1991  -1.31  1.00  -.15  7475  706  706  2700  3509
1992  1.01  1.10  -.38  6473  -3698  -2992  727  3503
1993  .22  1.40  -;69  -833  -7776  -10769  -7272  -6900
1994  -1.25  1.81  -.91  -6027  -9444  -20214  -18325  -28853
1995  -1.61  2.36  -1.13  -6577  -6870  -27085  -26950  -56070
1996  -1.14  -0.83  -.81  -11599  -1970  -29056  -32014  -82494
1997  -.83  -1.49  -.40  -6265  5619  -23438  -28066  -96626
1998  .07  0.18  ...40  3726  13404  -10034  -13669  -88211
1999  .52  0.11  -.45  6429  12161  2125  205  -64039




Consumption  Investment  Consumption  Exports  Imports  GDP  Prices  Wages
1991  -.09  -1.36  .71  .38  -.10  -.09  -2.88  -2.75
1992  .19  -1.65  .14  .47  -.11  -.05  -3.21  -3.36
1993  .46  -1.62  -.79  .87  .19  .03  -1.28  -1.41
1994  .42  -1.62  -1.36  1.35  .39  .00  1.16  1.16
1995  .02  -2.02  -1.37  1.62  .10  -.24  3.12  3.15
1996  -.50  1.13  -2.47  -.89  -.65  -.51  2.59  2.60
1997  -1.13  .78  -2.33  -1.89  -1.76  -.98  -.45  -.57
1998  -1.00  -2.14  -.55  -.99  -2.65  -.91  -2.38  -2.85
1999  -.42  -1.60  -.59  -.77  -1.95  -.48  -1.47  -2.00
Competi-  Capital  Budget  Current  Base
tiveness  LIBOR  Stock  Deficit  Balance  Reserves  Money  M2
=%  % pts  %  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn  $mn
1991  -.62  1.17  -.19  4910  344  344  1653  2149
1992  -.01  1.51  -.45  5047  -701  -358  2296  4552
1993  -.97  1.81  -.67  2507  -2298  -2657  666  4184
1994  -1.98  2.13  -.83  1669  -2581  -5238  -1469  1139
1995  -2.22  2.56  -1.03  3106  -709  -5948  -1351  -926
1996  -1.24  -0.86  -.64  -2026  -3744  -9693  -5637  -8004
1997  .70  -1.60  -.38  -914  -2865  -12560  -8747  -17207
1998  2.10  0.15  -.70  2256  3937  -8623  -4209  -18016
1999  1.16  0.09  -.86  -534  1683  -6940  -2669  -16604
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